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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SUE LACY OLSEN,
Plaintiff, Respondent
SCT 111 7040

vs.
REED J. OLSEN,
;.

Civil No. 17377

Defendant, Appellant
BRIEF OF. APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

.

This is an appeal from a Memorandum Decision and Order
signed April 24, 1978 denying Appellant's Motion for a New
Trial; and is also an appeal of the Decree of Divorce entered
March 26, 1980 in the First Judicial District Court of Cache
County, State of Utah, by the Honorable Ted S. Perry, District
Court Judge pro tern.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an equitable result reforming or remanding
the District Court's judgment concerning distribution of the
property.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's Complaint for divorce was filed September 1, 1978
seeking divorce, alimony, payment of debts, temporary
support, and the distribution of the parties' residence and
furniture with the proceeds divided between the parties, in
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an "equitable" division of the property "taking into consideration
each parties' (sic) contribution towards the purchase of
said property.'' The parties were married in Elko, Nevada
April 14, 1976, both having been previously married and
divorced and having children by their previous spouses. The
Plaintiff had been married more than one other time. Two
of Plaintiff's children and none of Defendant's children
resided with the parties.
That Plaintiff obtained a restraining order at the
time of filing the Complaint, but did not serve it or the
Complaint on the Defendant and thereafter reconciled with
the Defendant. Some six months thereafter, she left the
residence and went to live with her mother and sought an
O~der ordering Defendant out of the residence.
The Order
only was served on Defendant. Neither the Complaint nor the
Summons were served.
!

In responding to the Order to Show Cause, Defendant
alleged Plaintiff left of her own volition, that he had not
received a copy of the Complaint and that it would not be
equitable to require him to leave the dwelling in which he
was living and where he was making the payments. An order
to vacate the Order to Show Cause insofar as it required
th.e Defendant to leave the premises, based on Defendant's
affidavit, was entered ,in March of 1979 prior to a hearing.
The Court entered a temporary order after hearing at
which both parties were represented with counsel and required
the ·Defendant to maintain the resi.dence and the property
acquired by the parties during the marriage nntil the
matter was tried or the parties negotiated a property settlement,
allowing the Plaintiff to retrieve any personal eff 0 ~ts
owned prior to the marriage of the parties, requir Ln.'~ the
payment of temporary support money to be taken intn consider:ation
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at final resolution of the case, holding in abeyance the
matter of attorney's fees, requiring Defendant to pay debts
and obligations of the partie~ incurred during the marriage,
and to maintain the monthly opligations on the premises and
requiring the Plaintiff to ma~e payments on the Alpha Romeo
automobile in the event she obtained possession because she
had no other transportation. The automobile was jointly
owned.
Thereafter, the parties had at least one additional
~~conciliation in which they lived together but later separated.
Correspondence flowed between the attorneys representing the
respective parties in which the sole issue was a matter of
distribution of the residence, the automobile and personal
property of the parties. The proposals became quite detailed
but the parties were unable to agree or resolve their differences.
October 3, 1979 Plaintiff submitted Interrogatories to
Defendant9 Plaintiff moved to compel answers in November of
1979. Defendant's answers were filed December 6, 1979.
December 12 Plaintiff requested a trial setting. December
18 the ~ourt said the case would be· set after appropriate
rules had been followed. December 21, the Court set the
matter for trial after Plaintiff and Defendant had agreed at
the hearing on the 19th of December, 1979 that a trial day
setting could be made provided Defendant could continue
discovery through the time of trial. The trial was set for
March 7 as a second setting anp August 26, 1980 as a first
setting. Plaintiff finally an~wered Defendant's Interrogatories
February 21. february 29, the parties were advised that the
second setting would become a first setting, and Defendant
objected to the trial setting because of the need for additional
discovery. A continuance was granted without allowing
Defendant's counsel to get to the hastily called hearing,
but only until March 13, 1980 making it impossible to pursue
the additional discovery. Trial was held March 13, 1980
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without prior notice that a different judge (than had presided
at the Show Cause hearing) was assigned to the case.
Plaintiff's proposed form of Findings of ·Fact and
Conclusions of Law were altered somewhat after Defendant
objected to the form as not complying w'ith the actual findings,
but were not altered to Defendant's satisfaction. The Court
particularly refused to make a finding of the value of the
real property as shown by the evidence believed by the Court
at the trial; refused to make a finding of the amount of
~oney each party put into the house at the time the property
was bought and refused to reflect the evidence introduced at
trial that Plaintiff had contributed $8,000.00 and Defendant
had put in $28,118.26 towards the down payment of the house;
or that in addition Defendant had contributed $60,523.88 and
Plaintiff $7,728.13 to the marriage. The Court did consider
that bank interest rates were high at the time and said he
increased Plaintiff's equity to compensate, without any
party having requested the same and without making specific
findings. The Court further refused to require the Plaintiff
to return property removed from the premises in Defendant's
absence prior to the entry of the order. The interlineated
findings and decree were entered March 26, 1980, without
curing the Defendant's enumerated deficiencies and some
others.
During the course of the trial the Court refused the
Defendant opportunity to introduce testimony of hL) version
of the treatment between the parties, and found th-1t agreements
not
. actually made between the parties regarding di8oosal of
personal property were made; refused to accept the testimony
of the Defendant relative to the value of the premis~s;
refused to reflect in the jnd~~rncnt that- during the course of
the marriage the Defendant had contributed some $88 ,642. 7ltto the house and living expenses whereas the Plaintiff had
contributed $15,728.75; refused to consider in awar,.iing the

.
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personal property to the Plaintiff that he awarded all the
outstanding debts that went with it to the Defendant; refused
to consider that Defendant ha~ paid all the debts of the
parties during the time pending divorce while they were
separated except for Plaintiff's separate living expenses.
The Court also failed to consider testimony by the Defendant
of the extra cost of support experienced on Defendant's part
by supporting Plaintiff's chiidren who lived in the house.
In short, the Court did not p¢rmit·an oral.answer or defenses
during trial or ignored Defendant's evidence and regarded
the Defendant as if he had waived ~ny right to equitable
considerations by the Court because not filing a formal
written during the proceedings. The Coµrt made a finding
that the Plaintiff was entitled to share in the increased
value of the hoII)e off the top, and found the value to be
exactly what the Plaintiff said it was but did not apportion
the "shar~" according to the amount of money contributed
initially and as requested by the Complaint. The Court al~.o
made a finding of the Plaintiff's income .which was not
supported by evi~ence. The Court falsly found that the
distribution of the personal property had been agreed to by
the parties notwithstanding testimony from both parties as
to the non-agree~ent. T~anscript, page 36 lines 3-17; page
82 line 12 to page 93 line 5; page 113 line 18 to page 114
line 6. The Court also found after having refused Defendant's
testimony regarding incowe that~ nevertheless, Defendant
should pay all the bills even ~hough the personal property
was given to the Plaintiff for which many of the bills were
in~ being paid.
Finally, the Court refused to permit the Defendant
to enter testimony regarding defenses to allegations Plaintiff
' made that she had been subjected to mental or physical
cruelty.
The Court appeared to base its memorandum decision,
denying the motion for a new trial, on Defendant's failure
to file a formal answer notwithstanding the fact that he had
never been served, appeared to neither give the Defendant
equitable rights in conformance with the complaint (according
~

'
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to the contribution of each party) nor to give the Defendant
opportunity to testify fully to make the evidence conform
with his position.

POINT I
The Defendant has a right to present testimony at the
trial and have it fully considered even though no formal
written answer was ever filed.
:..

"All aspects of proceedings in divorce matters are
equitable." Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1126 (Utah
1974) •

This matter is in equity. It is believed that Rule
8(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does not demand a
written answer and the only issue in this situation is the
amount of damage:
" ••. Averments in a pleading to which no response or
pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as
denied or avoided." U.R.C.P. Rule S(d)
It is, therefore, asserted that Defendant should have
had full consideration and right to testify as to the cruel
treatment alleged by the Plaintiff in her Complaint. Defendant
had considerable dealings with the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff's
counsel and Rule 8(f) should be construed so as to do substantial
justice for the Defendant who did not contest the right of
the Plaintiff to seek divorce or division of property according
to each party's contdbution, but only contested the amount
of damages:
'' • . • the prevailing rule of equity pleading is that
allegat.ions of the bill are not to be deemed to have
b1~er1 a'"lmitted simply because the statements are ignored
by the answer. If the facts which the complainant has
alleged are material to his case, they must be established
by evidence." 27 Am Jur 2nd Sect. 202
The remedy of the Complainant in the eveut the Defendant
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fails to file an answer is ordinarily to take a decree pro
confesso. The Plaintiff failed to do this and the Defendant
vigorously resisted her restraining order and otherwise
refused to play dead. Thus, the prevailing rule of equity
rules in this situation and should be interpreted as the
Defendant having denied all, the allegations that the Plaintiff
made.
I

:.

"Generally, whenever interests of justice and· fair 'play
will be served thereby, the trial court should exercise
its discretion liberally in favor of giving the parties
an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the
case." Barber v. Calder, 522 P2d 700 (Utah 1974).

The Trial Court in this _situation should have used a
liberal interpretation of the pleadings and considered the
equity arguments in this situation so as to allow an opportunity
for a hearing on the merits of the case. _This was ~ot
complied with. Defendant was not given a fair opportunity
to have his opinion considered in this situation.
Even if the Defendant was deemed to have accepted the
allegations in the Plaintiff's Complaint, no evidentiary
facts were alleged in the Complaint. The Complaint asked
for equity. This is all the ?efendant wants on appeal.
"Whether the award of the division of property (in a
divorce case) is unjust or inequitable must necessarily
depend on the facts and circumstances of each particular
case." Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 382 P2d 412 (Utah 1963)
Plaintiff's ~omplaint for divorce filed September l,
1978 seeks divorce, alimony, payment of debts, temporary
support, and the distribution ;iof the parties' residence and
furniture with the proceeds divided between the parties, in
an "equitable division of the property" taking into consideration
each parties' (sic) contribution towards the purchase of the
said property." Equity is a fact situation in each circumstance
and the Plaintiff's complaint wanted an equitable division
of the property on terms the Defendant could accept, as
stated in
the complaint. He had contributed a lot more
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property to the marriage than had the Plaintiff, who introduced
the rule of division she wanted in the complaint. The Trial
I
Court failed to do this. It granted the Plaintiff the
possession of many items while requiring Defendant to pay
the indebtedness on them. It granted Plaintiff an inequitable
amount in the house, unjustified by the fact situation.
Because the Olsen divorce is an equitable matter, and
because the Court has failed to apply equity to the Olsen
fact situation, the Supreme Court should modify or remand
the judgment.

POINT II
The Trial Court erred in accepting the Pla~3tiff's
unsupported estimate of the value of the house at $100,000.
An owner of property may certainly testify ~s to its
worth. The Supreme Court reasoned in Utah State Road Commission v.
Johnson, 550 P2d 216 (Utah 1976) that the owner ~f real
estate is not presumed adequately qualified to express an
opinion of the market value by reason of his ownership
alone. The Plaintiff in this situation was certainly entitled
to express her opinion as to what the property value of the
house was. The Defendant was equally entitled to his opinion.
These opinions conflicted. The Plaintiff believed the house
to be worth $100,000, while the Defendant thought the value
of the home was around $85,000. Testimony of this type is
not conclusive, even if not contradicted. Anderso!lY• .. $!.9-.r~
Farm Fit:~~!~~-· Casul~gg1_~~ 583 P2d 101 (Utah 197()).
The Plaintiff and her counsel asked for an appraisal of
the house. "I think that the house should be appraised and
I think that the Defendant ought to be ordered to pay - _ return
her inv~:1 stment plus give her a share of the appreciation on
the
house." Trial transcript page 137, lines 12 to 15.
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Becaus·e 'the Plaintiff asked for an appraisal of the house
and the Defendant felt it wa1s worth much less than the
Plaintiff felt it was worth,: the Trial Court should have
awarded an appraisal of the pouse before it divided or
decided what equity the Defepdant could derive therefrom.
I

)

"Notwithstanding the equitable powers of district court
in interfamily controversies in divorce matters, and
the acknowledged broad latitude of discretion allowed
therein, the court cannot act arbitrarily, or on supposition
or conj ectm:·e as to facts upon which to justify its
order." Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P2d 1127 (Utah 1974)
The District. Cdurt in tP,is, situation simply assumed the
hous~ was worth $100 ,000 and: then ~wmehow determined that
fact and granted the Plaintiff $15,000 equity therein to be
paid off the top by the Defendant, or enforced as a lien,
without any apparent regard fO who contributed what percentage
of the supposed equity, selling commission, or Defendant's
right to get a fair eq.uity o:tf the top. If the house it
worth less, which the Defend~nt alleges, he has effectively
lost a considerable amount_ot money because of the Trial
Court's refusal to grant an ~ppraisal of the house. The
Trial Court acted on supposi~ion ~nd conjecture when it
assumed the house wa~ worth $100,000.

When a judgment has so ~ailed to do equity that it
manifests a clear abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court on
review will take appropriate corrective action in the inteiest
of justice. Waston v. Watson, 561 P2d 1072 (Utah 1977). In
Watson the Supreme Court stated that granting a motion for a
new trial does not necessarily need to involve setting aside
:e
the resolution of all the issues but can·be limited to
reopening the case to just whatever extent the Court deems
necessary and desirable in the interest of justice. In
. Watson there was serious discrepancy as to the true value of
the husband's investment in silver and turquoise Indian
t~
jewelry and to his income and.pensions. The Supreme Court
{I
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remanded the case for the purpose of giving both parties an
opportunity to make further disclosures and for an opportunity
to determine the actual value of these items.
Our situation is parallel to Watson. The District
Court failed to do equity in the case at hand. The Court
may grant a motion for a new trial on the issues that were
not resolved adequately at the District Court. Serious
differences of opinion exist as to the actual value of the
house. The Deiendant/Appellant desires to have an equitable
distribution of the property. He, in good faith, feels that
the house is worth less and that, in any event, the equity
given to his wife was not in accordance with the amount
contributed throughout the marriage or the house directly.
Because of the serious discrepancies involved in this situation,
the Appellant prays for relief and a re-trial to determine
the value of the house.
POINT III
The Trial Court erred by awarding certain property to
the Plaintiff and distributing the bills to the Lefendant
for those items. Evidence showed that the Der(!Ill ant contributed
$60,523.88 to the marriage exclusive of his $28,118.26 of
the $36, 118. 26 down payment while the Plaintiff c:,dded $7, 728.13.
The Court did not give adequate consiJeration to the fact
that the Defendant made numerous payments to joirt debts
during the course of the marriage before and afttr separation
which reduced the joint obligations of the parths prior to
trial. Because the Dc!fendant reduced the d(~bts on these
certain items and no longer had the value or benefit from
them, the Plaintiff should nov1 be required to take over
payments on these~ itens or reimliucse Defendant. Just as the
Court decided that the car which the Plaintiff and Defendant
paid on while they were rnarri.ed went to the Plaint 1 i-f in the
award, the Cou 1· t also decide<i tba t the payments W(n1 ld go
along
ear.
It would
bethe Institute
justof Museum
and and
equit:abl_;
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in this situation to allow the Plaintniff to pay for the
items that she is getting the benefits of. The case should
be remanded for this purpose also, particularly where the
record shows Defendant did not agree to the distribution
awarded and which the Court justified by finding the parties
had agreed. Transcript page 82 line 12 to page 87 line 15.
If it appears that a divorce decree is not an equitable
allocation and is more likely to lead to further difficulties
~nd distress than to serve the desired objective, then a
reappraisal of the decree must be taken. Reed v. Reed, 594
P2d 871 (Utah 1979). The Defendant in this situation cannot
make payments on all the items the Plaintiff now has in her
possession plus the excessive equity in the house. If a
decree (divorce) causes financial distress, the ruling can
be reviewed if within a year after the final judgment either
party requests it. Klein v. Klein, 511 P2d 1284 (Utah
1973). The Defendant is or will experience financial distress
attempting to pay for several items the Plaintiff has in her
possession plus the exorbitant amount of equity the Trial
Court awarded to the Plaintiff in the house. Because of
this financial distress, the Supreme Court should review the
situation and grant relief to the Defendant/Appellant concerning
the payments on items not now in his possession being enjoyed
.by the Plaintiff/Respondent and the excessive amount of
equity found in the house.
CONCLUSION
The Trial Court particularly refused to make a finding
of the value of the real property involved as was shown by
the evidence believed by the Court at the trial. The Court
refused to make a finding of the amount of money each party
put into the house at the time the property was bought and
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refused to reflect the evidence introduced at the trial that
the Plaintiff had contributed $8,000 and the Defendant had
put in $28,.118.26 towards the down payment of the house.
The Court
account that the Defendant
. also refused to take into
.
had contributed $60,523.88 and the Plaintiff $7,728.13 to
the marriage when it came to dividing up the furniture and
debts and other items. The Court further refused to require
the Plaintiff to return property removed to the premises
prior to the entry of the order. The interlineated findings
~and decree were entered March 26, 1980 without curing the
enumerated deficiencies and some other things.
~

.

The Trial Court erred when not allowing sufficient
consideration of Defendant's evidence because of failure to
file an answer in equity. The Court also erred because it
did not apply reasonable means to determine the actual value
of the home. The Court furt~er erred in awarding the Plaintiff
several items that Defendant.was required to pay bills on
without receiving benefit thereof and thereby creating
financial difficulties for the Defendant. Because of the
problems that have arisen in this case and because equity
was not ~erved, Defendant prays for relief, reform and
remanding of this case to the Trial Court to determine the
value of the house in question and the equity of allowing
the Plaintiff to have the benefits of items that Defendant
must pay for.
Plaintiff sued asking for distribution according to the
contribution of each party. pefendant only sought that
result in the hearing. The Court should have grant<:d the
property distribution according to that scheme and should
now be so ordered.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~day

of July, 1980.

Raymond N. Malouf, For

INS
ys for Defendant,
21 We t Center
Logan, UT 84321
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